Drug-Induced Alteration of Psychotic Behavior: Who Benefits? by Schaefer, Gerald J.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Journal of Law and Health Law Journals
1994
Drug-Induced Alteration of Psychotic Behavior:
Who Benefits?
Gerald J. Schaefer
Georgia State
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jlh
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Law and Psychology Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
of Law and Health by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gerald J. Schaefer, Drug-Induced Alteration of Psychotic Behavior: Who Benefits?, 9 J.L. & Health 43 (1994-1995)
DRUG-INDUCED ALTERATION OF PSYCHOTIC
BEHAVIOR. WHO BENEFITS?
GERALD J. SCHAEFER1
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 43
II. THE PHARMACOLOGY OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS ............ 45
A. Behavioral Characteristics of Antipsychotic Drugs ..... 46
B. Toxic Side Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs ........... 47
1. Neurological Side Effects .................... 48
a. Akathisia ............................... 48
b. Acute Dyskinesia .......................... 48
c. Parkinsonism ............................. 49
d. Tardive Dyskinesia ........................ 49
2. Cardiovascular Side Effects .................. 50
3. Endocrine Side Effects ....................... 51
C. Patient Compliance ............................. 51
III. THE LAW AND ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS .................... 51
A. The Involuntary Administration of Antipsychotic
Drugs to Civilly Committed Patients ............... 52
B. The Involuntary Administration of Antipsychotic
Drugs to Criminally Committed Patients ............ 61
C. The Involuntary Administration of Antipsychotic
Drugs to Pretrial Detainees ....................... 65
IV . SUMMARY ......................................... 67
I. INTRODUCTION
Defining mental health and mental illness remains a difficult task, even in
the Decade of the Brain.2 Criteria used to determine mental illness depend to
1Director, Department of Neurosciences, MPI Research (formerly International
Research and Development Corporation), Mattawan, Michigan; B.A. University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1968; M.A. University of Akron, 1970; Ph.D. Vanderbilt
University, 1974; J.D. Georgia State University, 1994. Prior to joining MPI Research, Dr.
Schaefer was Associate Professor of Psychiatry and Assistant Professor of
Pharmacology, Emory University, School of Medicine.
2Lewis L. Judd, 1990 Made Decade of the Brain, 20 NEUROSCIENCE NEWSL. 2 (1989).
President Bush signed into law a joint resolution of Congress (H.J. Res. 174) declaring
January 1,1990, the start of the Decade of the Brain. The purpose of this resolution was
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some extent on the culture or society, and tend to change over time.3 For
example, psychosis is currently defined as a severe mental disorder in which
there is a marked impairment of behavior as well as a manifest inability to think
coherently, to comprehend reality, or to gain insight into one's own abnormal
condition.4 Because psychosis is so devastating Western society usually
intervenes to prevent self-harm and harm to others, as well as to prevent abuse
of the psychotic individual by others. Important questions arise regarding the
type of intervention that is appropriate and when the psychotic may refuse the
proffered treatment.
While Freud suggested early in this century that psychosis might result from
a biochemical abnormality,5 it was a chance discovery in 1952 that ushered in
the era of modem psychopharmacology. 6 Delay and Deniker reported that the
drug chlorpromazine (Thorazine R, an aliphatic phenothiazine) reduced
psychotic symptoms in affected patients. 7 Since then a class of drugs called
neuroleptics or antipsychotics has been the mainstay of treatment for inpatients
and has also advanced the public policy of deinstitutionalizing patients
whenever possible.
Given the debilitating nature of psychosis, those affected are often unable to
give informed consent about taking the medication. A crucial question is
whether civil or criminal authorities can force the individual to take
antipsychotic medication and under what circumstances this should be
permitted. This review will focus on the current legal status of involuntary
treatment with antipsychotics in various patient populations. The
constitutional issues involved will be considered in light of both the patient's
to increase recognition of and federal funding for neuroscience research, including
studies on schizophrenia.
3 Nancy C. Andreasen, Schizophrenia: Diagnosis and Assessment, in PSYCHO-
PHARMACOLOGY: THE THIRD GENERATION OF PROGRESS 1087 (Herbert Y. Meltzer ed.,
1987).
4Ross J. Baldessarini, Drugs and the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in THE
PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 383 (Alfred G. Gilman et al. eds., 8th ed.
1990).
5Joseph T. Coyle & S.J. Enna, Neuroleptics, in NEUROLEPTICS: NEUROCHEMICAL,
BEHAVIORAL, AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 Joseph T. Coyle & S.J. Enna eds., 1983).
6Frank J. Ayd, The Early History of Modern Psychopharmacology, 5 NEURO-
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 71 (1991).
7Jean R. Delay et al., The Treatment of Excitement and Agitation States By a Method of
Medication DerivedfromHibernotherapy, 110 ANNALS MED. PSYCHOL. 267 (1952). The term
"neuroleptic" was coined by Delay and Deniker, and literally means "that which takes
the neuron." It should be noted, however, that prior to the introduction of the
phenothiazines, reserpine was used to treat schizophrenia in India. See G. Sen & K.C.
Bose, Rauwolfia Serpentina: A New Indian Drug For Insanity and High Blood Pressure, 2
INDIAN MED. WORLD 194 (1931), as cited in Elliot Richelson, Pharmacology and Clinical
Considerations of the Neuroleptics, in NEUROPHARMACOLOGY OF CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM
AND BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS 123 (Gene C. Palmer ed., 1981).
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and the civil or criminal institution's rights and duties. A review of the literature
suggests there is a critical need for a balanced position on this controversial
medical and legal issue. Before attempting to negotiate the legal landscape,
however, it is necessary to describe the drugs themselves. No intelligent
decision can be made without an understanding of what these chemicals do.
II. THE PHARMACOLOGY OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
An antipsychotic is a drug used to treat a psychosis such as schizophrenia,
a condition characterized by emotional withdrawal, apathy, disordered
thinking and lack of interpersonal relationships. 8 Sometimes "schizophrenia"
and "psychosis" are used interchangeably, but this is incorrect because the term
"psychosis" embraces a wide range of mental diseases.9 Broad subdivisions
include the affective disorders (major depression and mania), organic
psychoses (resulting from definable toxic, metabolic or neurological causes)
and idiopathic ("functional") psychoses. It is the idiopathic psychoses, for
which the underlying cause remains obscure, that more closely correspond to
the term schizophrenia. The term "neuroleptic" is used synonymously with
"antipsychotic", and refers to the "syndrome neuroleptique" described in the
original paper on chlorpromazine. 10 To be consistent with both the legal and
the medical literature, the terms "neuroleptic" and "antipsychotic" will be used
interchangeably in this article.
Contemporary biological research is based mainly on the so-called
dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia in which it is theorized that
schizophrenia is due to an over-activity or relative excess of the
neurotransmitter dopamine in the brain.1n The hypothesis derives from the
demonstration that clinically effective antipsychotic drugs block dopamine
receptor sites in the brain and reduce dopaminergic transmission. In contrast,
high doses of dopamine-releasing drugs, such as amphetamine, produce
symptoms resembling paranoid schizophrenia. 12 However, in vivo studies
measuring dopamine metabolites such as homovanillic acid (HVA) have failed
to demonstrate differences between normals and unmedicated
schizophrenics, 13 as has an examination of autopsied brain material from the
8Andreasen, supra note 3, at 1087.
9 See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. rev. 1987).
10 Sven Ove Ogren & Thomas H6gberg, Novel Dopamine D-2 Antagonists for the
Treatment of Schizophrenia, 2 ISI ATLAS SCI.: PHARMACOLOGY 141 (1988).
11P.J. McKenna, Pathology, Phenomenology and the Dopanine Hypothesis of
Schizophrenia, 151 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 288 (1987).
12Yousry Sayed & John M. Garrison, The Dopamine Hypothesis of Schizophrenia and the
Antagonistic Action of Neuroleptic Drugs-A Review, 19 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 283
(1983).
13 JACK R. COOPER ETAL, THE BIOCHEMICAL BASIS OF NEUROPHARMACOLGY 309 (5th ed.
1986).
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two populations.14 More recently, non-invasive brain imaging techniques such
as positron emission tomography (PET scans) and magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) have begun to show promise as reliable and sensitive techniques for
ascertaining central nervous system differences between control and
schizophrenic populations.15
Since the initial report of the antipsychotic properties of chlorpromazine in
1952, there has been a major research effort to develop more effective drugs
with fewer or less severe side effects. Although no compound has been found
to be clinically more effective than chlorpromazine, 16 the antipsychotics differ
in their degrees of various side effects, the most troublesome of which are the
neurological symptoms.
A. Behavioral Characteristics of Antipsychotic Drugs
Antipsychotics often produce sedation.17 However, they should not be,
although they often are, regarded as sedatives. Unfortunately, antipsychotics
are sometimes referred to incorrectly as "major tranquilizers."18 In fact,
antipsychotics produce a normalizing effect. 19 The drugs may slow down
excited patients and, in particular, may reduce hostile or aggressive behavior.
However, the drugs can also speed up retarded patients who are withdrawn
or autistic, thus rendering them more accessible, responsive and
communicative. It was recently demonstrated, for example, that neuroleptics
improve attentional processes and the ability to concentrate in
schizophrenics. 20 In addition, these compounds reduce such symptoms as
auditory hallucinations, delusions and indifference to the environment. The
behavioral effects, however, are time-dependent. During the first few weeks of
antipsychotic medication, aggression is decreased and cooperation and
socialization are increased.21 Thought disorders, auditory hallucinations and
141d. at 309-310.
1 5 G6ran Sedvali, PET Imaging of Dopamine Receptors in Human Basal Ganglia: Relevance
to Mental Illness, 13 TRENDs IN NEUROSCIENCES 302 (1990).
1 6 Arthur Rifkin & Samuel Siris, Drug Treatment of Active Schizophrenia, in
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: THE THIRD GENERATION OF PROGRESS, supra note 3, at 1095; John
M. Kane, Treatment of Schizophrenia, 13 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 133 (1987).
1 7 Baldessarini, supra note 4, at 388.
18Id.
19John Davis et al., Neuroleptics and Psychotic Disorders, in NEUROLEPTICS:
NEUROCHEMICAL, BEHAVIORAL, AND CLINICAL PERSPECrIVES, supra note 5, at 15.
20Paul G. Nestor et al., Neuroleptics Improve Sustained Attention in Schizophrenia: A
Study Using Signal Detection Theory, 4 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 145 (1991).
21See John M. Davis et al., Important Issues in the Drug Treatment of Schizophrenia, in
SCHIZOPHRENIA 1980,109 (1980).
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delusions are not altered until after approximately two weeks, a phenomenon
referred to as the "neuroleptic lag-time".22
Studies in animals suggest that antipsychotics reduce the rewarding value
of natural (food and water) and artificial (drugs such as cocaine and intracranial
self-stimulation) stimuli.23 Hence, the neuroleptics are said to produce
anhedonia by blocking an overly active dopamine system in the brain's
"reward sites" such as the nucleus accumbens, olfactory tubercle and the
prefrontal cortex.24
The normalizing effect of antipsychotics described in schizophrenic patients
stands in marked contrast to the effects reported in controls, an issue that is
seldom addressed. A single 0.75 mg dose of haloperidol (Haldol R, a
butyrophenone) reduced spontaneous locomotor activity in healthy male
volunteers. 25 This is consistent with their reported effects in animals.
26
However, not only is movement slowed, but thinking is slowed as well, and
subjects report an "inner restlessness" or akathisia along with severe anxiety
and dysphoria that may occur within hours after drug administration. 27 As
discussed below, it is highly probable that some of these effects are also
produced in schizophrenics.
B. Toxic Side Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs
While the antipsychotics have proven effective in the treatment of
schizophrenia, they are notorious for a wide range of undesirable side effects,
including neurological, cardiovascular, and endocrinological abnormalities. 28
The most disturbing and the most apparent of the side effects are the
neurological symptoms.
2 2 Baldessarini, supra note 4, at 402.
2 3 Roy A. Wise, Neuroleptics and Operant Behavior: The Anhedonia Hypothesis, 5
BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN ScI 39 (1982).
2 4 Baldessarini, supra note 4, at 384.
25S. Frey et al., Spontaneous Motor Activity in Healthy Volunteers after Single Doses of
Haloperidol, 4 INT'L CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 39 (1989).
26 GeraldJ. Schaefer & Richard P. Michael, Drug Interactions on Spontaneous Locomotor
Activity in Rats: Neuroleptics and Amphetamine-Induced Hyperactivity, 23
NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 909 (1984).
2 7Brian G. Anderson et al., Prolonged Adverse Effects of Haloperidol in Normal Subjects,
305 NEw ENG. J. MED. 643 (1981); Robert H. Belmaker & David Wald, Haloperidol in
Normals, 131 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 222 (1977); Kenneth S. Kendler, A Medical Student's
Experience with Akathisia, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 454 (1976).
2 8 Baldessarini, supra note 4, at 389-92; George M. Simpson et al., Adverse Effects of
Antipsychotic Agents, 21 DRUGS 138 (1981).
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1. Neurological Side Effects
According to the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia, the manifestation
of the disease results from an overactivity of dopamine in the limbic (nucleus
accumbens and olfactory tubercle) and prefrontal areas of the brain.29 These
are the therapeutic target sites for the neuroleptics. However, dopamine also
plays a prominent role in areas that control movement, the so-called
extrapyramidal sites which include the striaturn, caudate putamen and globus
pallidus.30 Most neuroleptics block dopamine in the extrapyramidal areas and
this blockade produces the neurological side effects. A new generation of
neuroleptics exemplified by clozapine (ClozarilR, a dibenzodiazepine) appears
to have few or no extrapyramidal side effects, and hence produces
antipsychotic results without pronounced neurological symptoms.31 To the
author's knowledge, all court cases to date have dealt with the classical
antipsychotics such as chlorpromazine, haloperidol, thioridazine and
mesoridazine (Mellaril R and Serentil R, respectively, piperidine
phenothiazines), fluphenazine (Prolixin R, a piperazine phenothiazine),
thiothixene (Navane R, a thioxanthene) and molidone (Moban R, a
dihyroindolone). Neurological side effects are prominent features of therapy
and some knowledge of them is essential.
a. Akathisia:
Akathisia refers to a pattern of restless motor activity. Patients complain of
a lack of ability to tolerate inactivity along with internal discomfort, a drive or
urge to move or an inability to sit, stand or lie still. Akathisia usually does not
begin within the first forty-eight hours of neuroleptic treatment, but when
given to normals it may begin much sooner. The incidence of akathisia may
increase over the course of drug treatment up to three months from the start of
administration, and the overall incidence rate is considered to be about twenty
percent. 32
b. Acute dyskinesia:
Sometimes called dystonia, this side effect usually occurs immediately after
the start of treatment and consists of intermittent or sustained muscular spasms
and abnormal postures of the eyes, face, neck and throat.33 The effects are often
painful, and may be frightening and disturbing both to the patient and to those
around him.34 These signs are the first to appear, sometimes occurring within
2 9 COOPER, supra note 13, at 309.
3 0 1d. at 281.
31Ogren & H6gberg, supra note 10, at 141.
3 2 Daniel Tarsy, Neuroleptic-Induced Extrapyramidal Reactions: Classiflcation, Descrip-
tion, and Diagnosis, 6 (Supp. 1) CLINICAL NEUROPHARMACOLOGY S9, S16-S17 (1983).
33Id. at S9.
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hours after the first dose, and the incidence rate is about five percent.35 The
symptoms can be readily treated by the concomitant administration of an
anti-cholinergic agent such as benztropine (Cogentin R).
c. Parkinsonism:
In some instances, the administration of neuroleptics produces the
neurological signs of Parkinson's disease, including akinesia (lack of voluntary
movement), bradykinesia (slowness of movements), rigidity, tremor and
postural abnormalities.36 There may be reduced facial expression and an
absence of the normal arm swing. These signs may begin within several days
of the onset of drug administration and most cases occur within three months
of original treatment.37 The overall incidence rate is reported to fall between
ten and fifteen percent.38 In addition, there is some evidence that tolerance
occurs to the parkinsonian effect.39 That is, with continued drug
administration, the severity of these side effects decreases.
d. Tardive dyskinesia:
When the dyskinetic signs occur late (i.e., tardive, after at least three months)
in the course of treatment, the phenomenon is referred to as tardive dyskinesia.
The effect is characterized by stereotyped, involuntary movements of the face,
tongue and mouth, and sometimes involve movements of the trunk and
limbs.40 The patient displays tics and facial grimacing which are socially
disabling. It is important to note that tardive dyskinesia is drug induced rather
than part of the natural progress of schizophrenia. It is estimated that between
five and twenty percent of all patients administered neuroleptics for more than
one year will show signs of tardive dyskinesia,4 1 although some authors report
a higher incidence.42
34Paolo Decina et al., Painful Sensory Symptoms in Neuroleptic-Induced Extrapyramidal
Syndromes, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1075 (1992).
35Tarsy, supra note 32, at S10.
361d. at S12.
371d. at S13.
38Id.
39Tarsy, supra note 32, at S15.
40 0gren & Hogberg, supra note 10, at 141; Sheila Taub, Tardive Dyskinesia: Medical
Facts and Legal Fictions, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 833 (1986).
41
-Ial Morgenstem, The Impact of Neuroleptic Medication on Tardive Dyskinesia: A
Meta-Analysis of Published Studies, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 717 (1987); John M. Kane et al.,
The Prevalence of Tardive Dyskinesia, 21 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 136 (1985); Tarsy,
supra note 32, at S21.
42 Taub, supra note 40, at 836.
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There are certain risk factors which predict tardive dyskinesia and, therefore,
may be helpful in its prevention.43 As noted above, the longer the duration of
neuroleptic administration, the greater is the chance of tardive dyskinesia.44
Similarly, the higher the relative dose of the neuroleptic, the greater is the
incidence of tardive dyskinesia.45 The very young and the very old are at a
disproportionately higher risk for tardive dyskinesia than are those in
between.46 Females develop it more often than males, but males develop it
more severely.4 7 The administration of anti-parkinson drugs along with
neuroleptics increases the risk of tardive dyskinesia.4 8 Perhaps the most
predictive risk factor, however, is the incidence of acute extrapyramidal
symptoms. 49 Hence, the physician should be wary of continuing the
neuroleptic treatment in patients that display acute extrapyramidal signs. She
can either lower the dose or switch to a different antipsychotic drug.
2. Cardiovascular Side Effects
The most prominent cardiovascular side effect of antipsychotics is postural
or orthostatic hypotension, a form of low blood pressure that occurs when the
patient stands.50 This side effect occurs quite often following initial treatment
with the drug. Tolerance develops to this effect, so that after several weeks
blood pressure returns to normal.51
A potentially fatal, but rare, side effect of antipsychotics is the neuroleptic
malignant syndrome. This effect is characterized by hyperthermia, rigidity and
respiratory distress. 52 This syndrome can occur anytime during drug
treatment, but generally occurs within two weeks of the initial administration
when the patient may be "loaded up" with high doses resulting in cardiac
dysfunction.53 At the first indication of this syndrome, immediate cessation of
neuroleptic treatment is required and supportive care is essential.
43 Richard L. Borison, Lecture presented at the Georgia Mental Health Institute (Oct.
28, 1981).
44Id.
4 51d.
4 6 1d.
47Lecture from Richard L. Borison, supra note 43.
48Id.
4 9 1d.
50Simpson, supra note 28, at 138.
5 1 d.
52Stanley N. Caroff, The Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, 41 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
79 (1980); Charles A. Kaufmann & Richard J. Wyatt, Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, in
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: THE THIRD GENERATION OF PROGRESS, supra note 3, at 1421.
53Kaufman & Wyatt, supra note 52, at 1421.
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3. Endocrine Side Effects
In addition to blocking dopamine receptor sites in the presumed target areas
and in the motor areas, the neuroleptics block dopamine in the hypothalamus
and pituitary. This produces endocrine changes, the most prominent of which
is an increased secretion of the hormone prolactin.5 4 The administration of the
neuroleptics and the consequent prolactin surge have been demonstrated to
produce breast enlargement and galactorrhea (a continued discharge of milk
from the breasts) in both male and female patients. 55 The results can be
extremely disconcerting and embarrassing to the patient, regardless of his or
her mental condition.
C. Patient Compliance
When a diagnosis is made and a prescription order is written, it is assumed
that the patient will take her medicine as directed. Empirical evidence suggests
that a significant proportion of non-institutionalized, voluntary patients do not
fully comply.56 This also appears to be an issue for psychiatric inpatients.57 In
order to derive therapeutic value, the patient must take the correct dose at the
proper time and continue the regimen as directed without taking unprescribed
medicines which may produce adverse drug interaction effects. A further
complication arises in institutions where patients or inmates have been found
to obtain a neuroleptic illicitly, mistaking it for another drug such as diazepam
(Valium R).58 Ingestion of the neuroleptic may produce the side effects
described above and require medical intervention. 59 These are important issues
which must also be considered by institutional authorities (and courts) when
making treatment decisions.
Ill. THE LAW AND ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
The description of the antipsychotic drugs reveals a marked ability to restore
normal behavior as well as a tendency to produce serious side effects.
Unfortunately, those who would potentially benefit from them may not be
competent to give informed consent to their administration and may not
appreciate the risks and discomfort associated with neuroleptic
54 Robert T. Rubin, Prolactin and Schizophrenia, in PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: THE THIRD
GENERATION OF PROGRESS, supra note 3, at 803.
5 5 Baldessarini, supra note 4, at 392.
56Leslie Z. Benet, Principles of Prescription Order Writing and Patient Compliance
Instructions, in THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS, supra note 4, at 1640.
57E.H. Hare & D.R.C. Willcox, Do Psychiatric Inpatients Take Their Pills?, 113 BRrr. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1435 (1967).
581d.
5 9 William W. Weddington, Jr. & Bennett L. Leventhal, Malicious Use of Haloperidol,
43 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 434 (1982).
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administration. In determining society's right and duty to administer
neuroleptics, three populations of patients can be identified: those patients that
have been civilly committed to a psychiatric institution, those convicted of a
crime and serving prison terms, and pretrial detainees. The issues are
somewhat different for each population and, therefore, they will be discussed
separately. For each population the issues involved, the current status based
on case law, and proposed guidelines will be addressed.
A. The Involuntary Administration of Antipsychotic Drugs to Civilly Committed
Patients
The right of incompetent civilly committed patients to refuse medication has
been dealt with at the state and federal court levels, but has not yet been ruled
on by the United States Supreme Court. While there is a trend for increased
judicial review when the patient refuses medication, in practice the patient
usually receives medication. 6° In an early and complex class action suit, Rogers
v. Okin,61 a federal district court in Massachusetts found that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause was a basis for an incompetent patient's right
to refuse medication (Thorazine, Mellaril, Prolixin and Haldol) in
non-emergency situations.62 The plaintiffs also raised a First Amendment right
to privacy issue. They argued that antipsychotic administration produced a
form of "mind control" that amounted to an unsanctioned intrusion upon the
individual's psychological integrity.63 The defendants argued that once
admitted, patients were per se incompetent to make medication decisions and,
therefore, the best clinical judgment of the professional staff was the proper
standard for determining appropriate therapy.64 The district court disagreed,
as did the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.65 Unless adjudicated to be
incompetent, patients could not be forcibly medicated, and even if found
incompetent patients could not be forcibly medicated absent an emergency, as
defined by the prevention of either imminent physical harm or further
deterioration in the patient's mental state.66
The Rogers decision was controversial. 67 Some hailed it as a victory for
patients' rights and as a judicial guarantee of their proper treatment. In
60Paul S. Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment with Antipsychotic Medications:
Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 413 (1988).
61478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
621d. at 1360.
631d. at 1366-67.
641d. at 1360-67.
65Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980).
66478 F. Supp. at 1361-62.
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contrast, the psychiatric community predicted the collapse of the public mental
health system.68 Both sides, however, exaggerated the consequences of Rogers,
and some good has resulted from this decision. It has recently been reported,
for example, that the court-ordered administration of antipsychotics can be
useful as a device to help assure that outpatients will comply with their
medication regimen.69 This compliance means that patients remain functional
outside the hospital, saving scarce Massachusetts resources and preventing a
serious side effect of psychosis itself, namely removal from community life.
In contrast to the Rogers decision in Massachusetts, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in Rennie v. Klein 70 held that antipsychotic medication could
be administered to an involuntarily committed patient in New Jersey without
his consent when necessary to prevent the patient from harming himself or
others. The court abandoned its earlier "least intrusive means" standard for
permitting antipsychotic treatment, and instead held that the standard for
determining whether or not to administer neuroleptics was the exercise of
professional judgment of the medical staff.71 That is, if in the expert opinion of
the psychiatrist it was best for the patient and the institution, then the patient
could be forced to take antipsychotic drugs. The obvious problem with this
decision is that no effective counterbalance existed against the biases of
"professional judgment" and hence this deference could be misused, an issue
later raised in Jarvis v. Levine.72
In Jarvis, a psychiatrist's request for involuntary treatment was denied by
the institution's Treatment Review Panel.73 Nonetheless, the patient was
administered the neuroleptic when the panel's decision was overruled by the
medical director. The constitutional issue of due process was apparent in Jan-is,
as was the patient's right to privacy.74 The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that
before neuroleptic medication (Navane, Prolixin and Serentil) could be forced
on an involuntary but competent patient in a non-emergency situation, a
judicial review procedure had to approve it.75
67 Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, The Boston State Hospital Case:
"Involuntary Mind Control," the Constitution, and the "Right to Rot", 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
720 (1980).
68Appelbaum, supra note 60, at 413.
69 Marilyn J. Schmidt & Jeffrey L. Geller, Involuntary Administration of Medication in
the Community: The Judicial Opportunity, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHATRY & L. 283 (1989).
70720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983).
711d. at 268-69.
72418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988).
731d. at 141-43.
741d. at 147-49.
751d. at 150.
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There may be a conflict between the institution's professional review
apparatus and an adversarial judicial review that wishes to preserve a patient's
right to refuse. Empirical evidence has shown that while agreement can be
reached between these two bodies, imposing both layers of review significantly
increased time to treatment, increased costs of treatment, and diverted the
limited time of physicians from patient care to judicial review.76 In fact, the
judicial review process was seen by the psychiatric staff as a hindrance rather
than a help in patient treatment because of the increased time and costs.77 As
is often the case, however, patients in public health facilities are largely from
the lower socioeconomic class and unless there is a strong advocate system
protecting their welfare, the institution's agenda may take precedence over the
patient's best interests.
For example, the United States Public Health Service has recently been
accused of pursuing its own interests, at the expense of patient welfare, in its
long-running study (1932-1972) of syphilis among poor black men in rural
Alabama. 78 In the now infamous Tuskegee Study, physicians working on the
federal project observed but did not treat syphilis patients, even though
penicillin was available as early as 1941 and its administration might have
saved the lives of some of the study's participants. Those in charge of the project
made the decision not to inform the patients about the new therapy and not to
treat them with an effective drug.
In People in the Interest of Medina,79 the Colorado Court of Appeals also
required a judicial hearing before antipsychotics (Thorazine and Prolixin)
could be administered in a non-emergency situation.80 The court established
criteria for determining when the judiciary should permit involuntary
administration of neuroleptics. These criteria included (1) the patient's
incompetence; (2) the danger he posed to himself and others; (3) the availability
of less intrusive alternatives; (4) the probable outcome with and without the
drug; (5) the effect on the operation of the mental institution; and (6) the
patient's need for the drug.8 1 Commentators have noted, however, that these
76Michael G. Farnsworth, The Impact of Judicial Review of Patients' Refusal to Accept
Antipsychotic Medications at the Minnesota Security Hospital, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY& L. 33 (1991).
77Id.
78 Jim Auchmutey, Ghosts of Tuskegee: The Government is Still Living Down Its Infamous
Study of Untreated Syphillis in Alabama, But to Doctors Who Took Part, There's Nothing to
ApologizeFor, ATLANTAJOURNAL/ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Sept. 6,1992, at M1. Dr. Louis
Sullivan, Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, referred to the
Tuskegee study as "an outrage." Physicians at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
worry that the legacy of Tuskegee is hampering its efforts to control AIDS, particularly
among blacks.
79662 P.2d 184 (ColoApp. 1982).
80Id. at 187.
811d. at 187-88.
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criteria differ little from those used by the institution's professional staff and,
instead, remove the decision-making process one step away from those who
are closest and best qualified to decide. 82
In State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein,83 the Wisconsin Supreme Court also held
that involuntarily hospitalized patients have a right to refuse neuroleptic
(Mellaril, Haldol and Prolixin) medication when there has been no judicial
determination of their incompetence. 84 It is of interest that the plaintiff patients
here were a nurse85 and a psychiatrist.86 Both were apparently familiar with
the drugs and both refused this treatment. The court was sensitive to abuses in
the system in which a patient's right to refuse medication could be ignored 87
and wanted to permit forced medication only when the patient was found
incompetent.
Again, available data do not support this judicial fear.88 During a six-month
study of involuntarily committed patients in Wisconsin, twenty-nine percent
of the patients on neuroleptics refused to continue treatment following the Jones
decision.89 Of those who refused, thirty-two percent resumed taking their
medication voluntarily, and courts overturned the refusals of the remaining
fifty-one percent who maintained their objections to further treatment. 90 While
patients may have felt some control over their condition, this came at the
expense of valuable clinical and judicial time. The authors further noted that
patients who did refuse were no more willing to take their medication after
going to court.91
In California involuntarily hospitalized patients must also be found
judicially incompetent to refuse treatment before they can be given
neuroleptics (Mellaril, Navane, Moban, Serentil) against their will when no
emergency exists.92 The Riese court wanted to be sure that the issue of
competence was determined judicially and not by the hospital administration.
The judicial determination of competence was based on such criteria as
82 Jeffrey L. Metzner, The Right to Refuse Treatment in Colorado: People v. Medina, 10
NEwsL: AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 17 (1985).
83416 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1987).
84 1d. at 896.
851d. at 891.
861d. at 889.
87416 N.W.2d at 890-91.
88 Robert D. Miller et al., The Impact of the Right to Refuse Treatment in a Forensic Patient
Population: Six-Month Review, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 107 (1989).
891d.
901d.
911d. at 118.
92 Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 243 Cal. App. 3d 241 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.
1987).
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whether the patient was aware of his situation, whether the patient understood
the benefits and risks of the intervention, and whether the patient was able to
understand and knowingly and intelligently to evaluate the information
required for her informed consent.93 If competent, the patient could refuse the
drugs.94
Such hearings may not provide any additional protection. In a recent study
of California involuntary patients, only seven percent refused neuroleptic
administration and only one percent were judged competent to refuse
medication. 95 Furthermore, judicial hearings sometimes produce their own
problems, such as allowing the court to make decisions about the type of
treatment. This should not happen. One way to avoid this would be to appoint
a conservator with power to decide medication issues during the pendency of
any judicial hearing to determine competence.
Levin and her colleagues 96 compared the status of patients who successfully
refused medication with the status of those who did not. These investigators
found that the refusers functioned poorly in the ward, tended to be disruptive
of the hospital environment and stayed twice as long in the hospital, even
though the refusing patients received the medication as a judicial requirement.
These findings suggest that it is better for the patient and the institution if
compliance can be obtained voluntarily rather than by judicial decree.
Following the Rivers v. Katz9 7 decision in New York, there was a marked
change in dealing with patients who refused antipsychotic medication
(Mellaril, Navane, Prolixin). Prior to Rivers, involuntarily hospitalized patients
who refused medication could appeal to a clinical administrative review board.
If this review panel agreed with the patient's psychiatrist, medication could be
administered over the patient's objection.98 The Rivers court, however, rejected
the "presumption of incompetence" for involuntarily admitted patients.99 After
Rivers, the clinical review process was the first step to appeal, followed by a
judicial review of the patient's competence. If the patient was found
incompetent, based on clear and convincing evidence, the judge could make a
substitute treatment decision, prescribing antipsychotic drugs if she
determined that their utility outweighed the risks.10 Fewer patients refused
9 3 1d. at 253-54.
9 4 1d. at 254.
95 Ren~e L. Binder & Dale E. McNiel, Involuntary Patients' Right to Refuse Medication:
Impact of the Riese Decision on a California Inpatient Unit, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 351 (1991).
9 6 Shelley Levin et al., A Controlled Comparison of Involuntarily Hospitalized Medication
Reftusers and Acceptors, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 161 (1991).
97495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
981d. at 339-40.
991d. at 341-42.
10OId. at 343-44.
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medication after the Rivers decision, but for those who did, the review process
was lengthy and the patients were not better served by the added expense and
time.101
When a patient is incompetent to consent to hospitalization itself, but is
nonetheless hospitalized without an involuntary placement hearing, he may
sue for a violation of his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983,102 as
occurred in Zinernon v. Burch,103 unless he is considered dangerous. Such
emphasis on informed consent, however, may deprive many potential
psychiatric patients of the very treatment they need. The due process argument
was recently raised in Williams v. Wilzack.10 4 The Maryland Court of Appeals
reviewed the procedural protections which must be applied to patients, such
as Williams, who face forced medication (Mellaril).105 Involuntarily admitted
patients were not presumed to be incompetent to refuse medication. Before the
medication was administered, the court wanted to allow the patient or his
representative to be given sufficient notice and the right to present their case
at a hearing. 106 The court implied that, absent an emergency, it might allow the
professional judgment approach to prevail when medication is an issue,
provided the patient's right to be heard is not violated. 107
The fundamental issue revolves around establishing a balance between the
medical-scientific duty to treat and the judicial duty to safeguard the individual
rights of patients. Constitutional issues of the First (privacy, freedom of thought
and speech), Eighth (cruel and unusual punishment), Fifth and Fourteenth
(due process) Amendments have been raised to limit or control the involuntary
use of antipsychotics. 108 These issues are important and deserve further
comment.
101J. Richard Ciccone et al., Right to Refuse Treatment: Impact of Rivers v. Katz, 18 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 203 (1990).
10242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), part of the Civil Rights Act, provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
103494 U.S. 113 (1990).
104573 A.2d 809 (1990).
105Id. at 809-12.
1061d. at 820-21.
1071d.
108 Amicus Brief, Okin v. Rogers (No. 77-1201), cited in 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
43 (1977).
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The history of the neuroleptics reveals that the drugs have helped reduce the
resident population in mental institutions since 1952.109 Former inpatients are
able to live with their families or in less-restrictive halfway houses.11 0 These
changes in patient populations argue against the issues concerning both
invasion of privacy and bodily integrity, and cruel and unusual punishment.
For inpatients and outpatients, the antipsychotics increase rather than decrease
freedom of speech and thought. They do not produce mind control, nor are
they a form of chemical brainwashing. Rather, the drugs normalize incoherent
thought, improve attention, reduce inappropriate behavior, and allow the
patient to communicate with others in an intelligible manner.111 Often the
administration of neuroleptics is the least intrusive means of shortening a
hospital stay and returning the patient to a community setting, as well as of
alleviating the psychological pain of racing thoughts and distressing
hallucinations. 112
Due process may be an issue in some circumstances. If the patient, family
member or another professional disagrees with the prescribing physician about
the appropriateness of drug treatment, a review mechanism should be
available prior to drug treatment or when continued treatment is at issue. To
ensure due process, the patient, her guardian, attorney and other interested
parties must be given sufficient notice of the time and place of the hearing as
well as of the issues to be decided. The form of review procedure will depend
upon whether the patient has been admitted voluntarily or involuntarily, and
whether the patient is competent. Competence itself is an elusive term whose
meaning depends upon a specific fact situation. As used in the present context,
competence means that the patient understands and appreciates the
information provided and that she realizes the information applies to her
condition.113 The patient should be able to process the information and reach
conclusions that logically follow from the information offered. If voluntary and
competent, the patient has a right to refuse medication. If the patient is
incompetent, a legal guardian or conservator may make the decision, unless
there is an emergency, in which case the professional judgment of the staff
should prevail. When admitted involuntarily but competent, the patient
should be allowed to refuse treatment unless there is an emergency or she is
1 0 9 SAMUEL BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 46 (3d ed. 1985).
110Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers
Construction Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. § 2689 (1963).
111David J. King, The Effect of Neuroleptics on Cognitive and Psychomotor Function, 157
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 799 (1990).
1 1 2 paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, "Rotting With Their Rights On":
Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L., 306, 312 (1979).
113Greg Smith, Depression and Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment, ETHICS CENTER
NEWS (Emory Univ./Center for Ethics in Pub. Policy & Professions, Atlanta, Ga.), Sept.
1992, at 6.
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considered dangerous. Finally, for the involuntarily admitted patient who is
found incompetent, treatment decisions should be determined by the
professional staff. If agreement cannot be reached after in-house review, a
judicial hearing could be invoked to determine issues of competence and drug
administration.
Many issues are now dealt with statutorily. For example, in Georgia, the
spirit and the letter of the law demand respect for the patient as well as his
access to the most appropriate treatment, and if necessary, a judicial hearing.1' 4
However, according to its Medical Director, at least at his institution the
threshold test for administering antipsychotics in an emergency is the
dangerousness standard.11 5 The institution takes the view that it does not have
a right to withhold medication when the patient presents a danger to himself
or to others. To prevent medical staff bias when the patient refuses medication,
a second physician must concur with the opinion of the first psychiatrist, and
the patient has a right to a court hearing on the issues. Furthermore, published
"Rules and Regulations for Patients' Rights" ensure that the patient is fully
informed about the medication, including its side effects, and emphasize that
the drugs are not used as punishment or for the convenience of the staff. In
addition, time limits are set. In an emergency, an admitting physician can
prescribe the drug for seventy-two hours. If such an emergency exists after
seventy-two hours, a second physician must concur with the admitting
physician and the two physicians' determination will remain valid for thirty
days.116
While side effects of antipsychotic medication cannot be ignored, the ratio
of benefits to risks must be emphasized. It is for this reason that informed
consent is obtained whenever possible. However, it is sometimes forgotten that
all drugs have side effects,117 and the voluntary patient is free to accept or refuse
treatment. While constitutional issues are raised concerning neuroleptic
treatment, the same could be done, for example, for cancer. The discovery of a
foreign mass generally results in emergency surgery, with its attending risks.
This is followed by a course of chemotherapy which produces severe nausea,
weight loss or gain, and extreme weakness. The chemotherapy is often
followed by radiation therapy with its additional side effects that can be painful
and disfiguring. Yet issues about the humaneness of treatment and bodily
integrity are seldom raised in this regard. The benefits are said to far outweigh
the risks.
This approach is equally valid for the use of antipsychotics in incompetent
patients. The release from impaired thinking and hallucinations, and the ability
114 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 37-3-162, 37-3-163 (1988).
115Interview with John Gustin, M.D., Medical Director of the Georgia Mental Health
Institute (Sept. 18, 1992).
1161d.
117Alan S. Nies, Principles of Therapeutics, in THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF
THERAPEUTICS, supra note 4, at 62.
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to return to society are often worth the risks of drug administration.
Withholding of the drug may mean that the patient becomes locked into his
own world and locked out of the community, including his family.18 The
argument has been considered that the patient should have the right to refuse
neuroleptic administration.119 However, commentators have noted that by
exercising the right to refuse treatment, the patient may be forfeiting his right
to eventual freedom from the illness and hospitalization, and the very waiver
of this right might be an incompetent one.120
Probably the most notorious side effect of the neuroleptics is tardive
dyskinesia, a syndrome which has resulted in much malpractice litigation. 12 1
Causes of action in tardive dyskinesia cases are grounded either in negligence
for failure to follow the proper standard of care in the diagnosis and treatment
of the behavioral disorder, or in failure to obtain informed consent.122 The risk
of tardive dyskinesia is real, but its prevalence is often over-rated. For example,
Bursztajn and his colleagues 23 presented a hypothetical case involving a
potentially psychotic patient that might require antipsychotic medication to a
group of psychiatrists and a group of judges. Both groups were asked the
degree of risks they would accept in order to obtain clinical benefits and also
the percentage of patients they expected to develop tardive dyskinesia.124
Either group was willing to accept a fifty percent rate of tardive dyskinesia in
order to obtain the antipsychotic response.125 However, the psychiatrists
predicted that twenty-five percent of the patients would actually develop
tardive dyskinesia, while the judges predicted that sixty-two percent would
develop this syndrome.126 These different perceptions suggest that
psychiatrists would be more willing to use neuroleptics than would judges,
who would probably forgo treatment. Indeed, the judges might well consider
psychiatrists who administer the drugs as behaving recklessly.
As described above, tardive dyskinesia can occur when antipsychotics are
administered ona long-term basis and there is insufficient follow-up to monitor
the slow onset of the symptoms. Both to protect her patient and to prevent a
118 Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 112, at 306.
119 Id. at 308.
120Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 67, at 722.
12 1 Harold Bursztajn et al., Medical and Judicial Perceptions of the Risks Associated with
Use of Antipsychotic Medication, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 271 (1991); Robert
M. Wettstein & Paul S. Appelbaum, Legal Liability for Tardive Dyskinesia, 35 HosP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 992 (1984); Taub, supra note 40, at 833.
122 Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa App. 1982); Wettstein & Appelbaum, supra
note 121, at 993.
123 Bursztajn, supra note 121, at 271.
1241d. at 271-72.
125 Id. at 272-73.
1261d.
[Vol. 9:43
ALTERATION OF PSYCHOTIC BEHAVIOR
negligence action, the psychiatrist must provide for regular check-ups and
consultation with other specialists, particularly neurologists.127 Lowering the
maintenance dose or switching to a different neuroleptic should be considered
when early signs of tardive dyskinesia appear. In addition, temporary
interruptions of drug therapy (drug holidays) are often used to monitor the
patient's progress while not under the effects of the neuroleptic.
For long-term maintenance, the psychiatrist should now consider
administering clozapine because of its negligible risks of tardive dyskinesia.12 8
However, patients on clozapine require careful hematologic monitoring,
because it is associated with a one to two percent risk of agranulocytosis (a
potentially fatal disease of the blood in which a marked drop in white blood
cells occurs).129 Clozapine is also very expensive (in 1992 $4,160 per year for
the drug alone),130 precluding its use in many public mental health facilities.
Regardless of whether the psychiatrist administers a traditional neuroleptic or
an "atypical" compound such as clozapine, the patient must be monitored on
a regular basis. In addition, updating the informed consent, particularly when
switching to new medication, affords good protection should a malpractice
action subsequently arise.
In sum, the patient's right to treatment or his refusal must be given respect
by way of procedural due process at both the institutional level and, if
necessary, at the judicial level. Once the decision to medicate with
antipsychotics is affirmed, the psychiatrist must provide non-negligent care in
selecting and monitoring the drug therapy and obtaining informed consent
from the patient, his family or legal guardian. Although risks of medication
will remain, they can be minimized and the benefits to the patient realized.
B. The Involuntary Administration of Antipsychotic Drugs to Criminally
Committed Patients
When the issue of antipsychotic drug administration arises in a prison
environment, a different analysis may be required. A criminal conviction and
sentencing per se amount to involuntary institutionalization. Requiring the
inmate to take neuroleptics is based on a determination of mental illness and
competence as well as a determination that drug treatment furthers a
compelling state interest, namely maintaining prisoners in a secure
environment. Unlike cases of neuroleptic administration in civil commitment,
the criminal side has been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.
12 7 John E. Kalachnik et al., A Tardive Dyskinesia Monitoring Policy for Applied Facilities,
19 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 277 (1983).
128Stephen R. Marder & Theodore Van Putten, Who Should Receive Clozapine?, 45
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 865 (1988).
1291d.
130Claudia Wallis & James Willwerth, Awakenings; Schizophrenia; A New Drug Brings
Patients Back to Life, TIME, July 6, 1992, at 52, 54.
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The leading case of forced administration of neuroleptics in a prison setting
is Washington v. Harper.131 In Washington, the Court had to decide whether
Washington State Penitentiary could treat a mentally ill person with
neuroleptics (Prolixin) against his will. While recognizing that the inmate had
a liberty interest based on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process grounds,
the Court was required to determine both what substantive and what
procedural due process safeguards were necessary before antipsychotics could
be forcibly administered.
To decide the substantive due process issue, the Court found it necessary to
scrutinize the circumstances when neuroleptics were appropriately
administered in spite of an inmate's liberty interest in not being forcibly
medicated. 132 If an inmate was found to have a serious mental illness, was
dangerous to himself or to others, and if the administration of neuroleptics was
a reasonable way to ensure prison safety and security, the State could require
the administration of antipsychotic drugs.'3 3
On the procedural due process side, the Court held that a judicial hearing is
not necessary for involuntary neuroleptic administration. Rather, an in-house
committee procedure is sufficient due process if the inmate is given notice of
the hearing and of the tentative diagnosis, has a right to be represented by a
disinterested state employee as a lay advisor, and is allowed to present
evidence.134 The inmate was allowed to appeal the decision to the
superintendent of the institution and to secure a timely (twenty-four hours)
decision. Furthermore, the treatment was allowed to continue only with
periodic review.13 5 Thus, the pivotal issue was whether the State could
administer antipsychotics without an adversarial, judicial hearing. The Court
answered in the affirmative.136
Much of the Court's reasoning was based on Vitek v. Jones.137 In Vitek, the
Court considered a related due process issue of whether or not a prisoner could
be transferred to a state mental hospital without adequate notice, a judicial
hearing and presence of counsel. The Vitek Court determined that, indeed, a
prisoner could not be involuntarily transferred to a psychiatric facility without
adequate procedural protections. 138 The interest of the state in segregating and
treating mentally ill prisoners was strong, but even stronger was the right of
the inmate not to be classified as mentally ill and segregated in a facility known
131494 U.S. 210 (1990).
1321d. at 221-27.
133Id.
1341d. at 228-36.
135494 U.S. at 216.
1361d. at 211-12.
137445 U.S. 480 (1980).
138d.
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for housing such individuals.139 Thus, the Court wanted to err on the side of
the inmate's liberty interest, which it considered fundamental. 140
Why did the Court in Washington reach its decision? One reason may be that
the plaintiff in Washington was already in a psychiatric facility. It can be argued
that a greater liberty interest exists in not being sent to a psychiatric facility than
in not being medicated once there. In Vitek, the prisoner's concern was being
labelled a psychiatric patient through his admission to a medical facility. That
issue was moot in Washington since the inmate was already a patient in a
psychiatric ward. Rather, the purpose of drug treatment in Washington was to
restore an inmate to a level of functioning where he could be returned to a
normal prison environment.
The dissent in Washington presented a parade of horrors about the uses and
effects of the neuroleptics, and then argued that Harper had a fundamental
liberty interest in remaining unmedicated. The dissenters also rebuked the
majority for not considering less intrusive methods of treating the patient.14 1
In distinguishing between the short-term (medical emergency) and long-term
(rehabilitation) condition, the dissent correctly raised the concern about
allowing prisoners to remain on these drugs without proper monitoring over
long periods of time.142 The issue of long-term administration of neuroleptics
is the same whether in a civil commitment or in a prison setting. The decision
to continue medication should focus on whether it is in the best interest of the
individual, but since the individual may do harm to others as well as to himself,
it may also involve the best interest of the institution. Such interests are separate
and probably in conflict. Furthermore, the dissenters implied that an in-house
psychiatrist would be biased toward the interest of the State rather than the
individual patient, and that the ethical principles of the physicians would
receive short shrift.143
The majority might have based its argument on the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment,
however, has also been interpreted as to place an affirmative duty upon prison
officials to provide inmates with medical care and protection from harm. These
rights have been articulated in Estelle v. Gamble144 and are two-pronged. Prison
officials are guilty of cruel and unusual punishment if they show indifference
to inmates' medical needs, and these medical needs are serious.14 5 When an
inmate has been diagnosed as seriously ill, the prison officials have an affirma-
13 9 1d. at 495.
140Id.
141494 U.S. at 255.
142 d. at 251-52.
14 3 d. at 253.
144429 U.S. 97 (1976).
14 5 1d. at 104-05.
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tive duty to treat.146 In addition, prison officials must be given deference in
maintaining security in an environment where the potential for violence is
always present. With the limited resources available, prison officials must make
decisions about prison security and the safety of staff and inmates. Allowing
courts to second-guess the judgment of hospital staff would, in effect, mandate
that the courts become involved in the day-to-day decisions of each institution.
Courts will not engage in such conduct. Prison officials must have broad
discretion in making decisions about the good order and security of their
institutions. 147 Furthermore, an inmate loses some of his liberty interests by
virtue of his conviction; he can not expect to live in an environment that is free
of all tribulation following his conviction. 148
The issue of involuntary administration of antipsychotics is best left to the
professional staff. As noted in Glickv. Henderson:149 "[ilt is the rare casein which
a court should venture forth to establish medical procedures and guidelines in
an area where the medical profession has not yet been able to ascertain what
they should be." Although the Glick court dealt with the controversial issue of
AIDS testing in prisons, the argument also applies to the administration of
antipsychotics to prison inmates.
While prison inmates do not lose all constitutional rights, their liberty
interests are not as broad and unrestricted as those of non-inmates. Prison
officials face difficult decisions in attempting to maintain order and security
within the prison as well as in providing for the medical needs of inmates.
Sometimes these needs conflict and the professional staff of the institution must
be given deference to make choices that affect the rights and safety of all
patients. Except in rare instances, requiring a judicial hearing to review the
medical decisions amounts to adding a layer of bureaucracy. More of the
already scarce prison resources are thereby allocated to reviewing medical
decisions. Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that the courts usually
concur with the professional prison staff.150
Although the Supreme Court in Washington limited its ruling to a prison
setting, one can speculate about how the Court would decide in the case of a
civil commitment. Based upon its holdings, it appears that when a patient had
a serious mental disease, was dangerous to himself or others, and treatment
was in the patient's best medical interest, then civil authorities would be
permitted to forcibly administer neuroleptics. Furthermore, the decision to
medicate would best be made by professional psychiatric judgment without
the intervention of a judicial decision maker. The Washington Court assumed
that physicians in a prison setting prescribe drugs only to meet the medical
1461d. at 103.
1470'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
148Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1315-16 (1981).
149855 F.2d 536, 541 (8th Cir. 1988).
150Miller, supra note 88, at 107.
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needs of their patients and that this conduct is grounded in their professional
ethics. Presumably, physicians in a civil setting would behave similarly.
C. The Involuntary Administration of Antipsychotic Drugs to Pretrial Detainees
The final category of institutionalized patients consists of those who have
been incarcerated and are awaiting trial, but have not yet been convicted of a
current crime. The issue often focuses on the pretrial detainee's right to refuse
antipsychotic medication in the context of determining competency to stand
trial. What rights to refuse medication do these patients have?
In United States v. Charters,151 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had
to decide whether the government's "duty" to treat pretrial detainees overcame
the defendant's liberty and due process interests. The court first determined
that a professional judgment standard as articulated in Youngberg v. Romeo152
was insufficient where the patient had strong liberty and due process interests.
In contrast, the government claimed that it had a duty to prevent violence in
the institution, to produce an individual competent to stand trial, and to protect
the inmate's health and well-being.153
Of particular concern was the issue of producing trial competence. First, the
court realized that there was "no way of knowing" whether Charters would be
rendered competent by administering the neuroleptics. 154 Second, the court
worried that when administered antipsychotic medication, the defendant
might not get a fair trial. The jury could get a "false impression" of the defendant
under the influence of the drug and the neurological side-effects might create
"important misimpressions about the defendant's mental state."155 Third, the
government's forcible administration of neuroleptics was considered a
"draconian invasion" of the individual's freedom and bodily integrity.156 On
rehearing, however, the circuit court decided en banc that Charters' interests
were adequately protected by exercise of the professional judgment standard
in deciding whether to medicate him.157
The recent Supreme Court decision in Riggins v. Nevada158 stands for the
proposition that forcible administration of antipsychotics (Mellaril) during a
trial violates the individual's due process rights. In Riggins, the defendant was
administered a neuroleptic prior to trial. When he requested suspension of the
151829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987).
152457 U.S. 307 (1982).
153829 F.2d at 492.
15 4 d. at 493.
1551d. at 493-94.
1561d. at 494.
157United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988).
158504 U.S. 127 (1992).
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drug during trial, his request was denied.1 59 He was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. The defendant argued that administering the neuroleptic
during trial camouflaged his true mental state thereby limiting his ability to
present an insanity defense.160 The Court overturned his conviction on due
process grounds acknowledging that the trial court made no determination of
either a medical need for the drug or the existence of a less intrusive
alternative. 161 The Supreme Court recognized that Riggins' defense may have
been impaired under the drug. Thus, the use of Mellaril denied defendant "a
full and fair trial."162
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, likened the forcible administration
of neuroleptics, which can modify behavior, to manipulating material
evidence. 16 3 His concern was about medicating an individual for the express
purpose of bringing the defendant to trial, rather than of rehabilitating him.164
Justice Kennedy argued that if the only method of rendering the defendant
competent to stand trial was forcible administration of antipsychotics, then the
trial court must resort to civil commitment.165 There is little doubt that the
defendant's behavior was observed throughout the trial and that his behavior
would have a powerful influence on its outcome. This is particularly the case
where, as here, the defendant took the stand, since his credibility and
persuasiveness would be assessed. Thus, there was particular concern with
how the neurological side effects might produce a negative demeanor on the
stand or at the defense table.166 Furthermore, use of these drugs could interfere
with the defendant's ability to interact with counsel if neurological side effects
were prominent.
The Court appears to have correctly decided Riggins. Although Justice
Thomas, in his dissent,167 denied that the defendant had an unfair trial because
of his medication, it appears highly likely that the drugs produced behavioral
changes. This, in turn, negatively affected the outcome for the defendant. The
dissent focused on whether the defendant might have feigned or exaggerated
his psychotic condition while un-medicated. If a psychotic condition is feigned
and the defendant is normal then neuroleptics, which severely impair the
behavior of normal individuals, should never be administered. An overriding
1 5 9 d. at 130.
160 d.
1 6 1 d. at 127.
162504 U.S. at 133.
163 d. at 139.
164 d. at 140-41.
1 65 d. at 145.
166504 U.S. at 142.
1 6 71d. at 146.
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concern should be that, to the extent possible, the jury observe the defendant's
behavior as it was during the alleged criminal event.
The determination of forcible medication turns on the patient's medical and
legal status. Pretrial detainees are involuntary patients. Although charged with
a crime, they have not yet been found guilty and, therefore, retain fundamental
liberty interests. These patients have a right to develop the best possible case
for acquittal at trial, provided it is substantively and procedurally correct.
Forcing antipsychotic drug administration is not permissible unless an
overriding medical justification exists, and none was present in Riggins. This
does not deny the State's legitimate interest in bringing an accused to trial. It
only requires the State to demonstrate that the medication is necessary to
render the accused competent and that the drug would not impair his trial
rights. The State, in effect, misused a powerful chemical to increase its chances
of getting a conviction. A drug that in the past was used to deinstitutionalize
civilly committed patients was used here to provide a candidate for capital
punishment.
IV. SUMMARY
The antipsychotic drugs or neuroleptics were serendipitously discovered in
the early 1950's as a treatment for schizophrenia. Although not a cure for this
complex disease, the neuroleptics have restored normal functioning to
countless institutionalized patients. Unfortunately the drugs also possess
debilitating side effects, the most serious of which are the neurological
symptoms. Because of the nature of schizophrenia, patients are often unable to
give informed consent about accepting neuroleptic treatment. When this
occurs in a civil commitment, the professional judgment of the medical staff
should determine the issue of competence; when the patient is found
incompetent, the psychiatrist should also establish the treatment protocol,
including the administration of antipsychotics. If an objection to drug
administration is raised by either the patient or his representative, the issue
should first be dealt with by an in-house treatment review board. Only when
no agreement can be reached, should the issue be adjudicated in a court of law.
The issue of competence in a criminal setting should be handled in a manner
similar to that of a civil commitment environment. If the professional judgment
of the psychiatrist indicates that the patient has a serious mental disease and
neuroleptic medication is in his best interest, then medication should be
instituted. This should not require judicial review.
A different situation exists for pretrial detainees. Here, the issue is generally
one of producing competence to stand trial. The State must demonstrate that
neuroleptics are necessary to accomplish this goal without also impairing the
accused's trial rights. It is in the sphere of pretrial detainee rights that
neuroleptics appear most subject to abuse.
Regardless of the environment, however, it must be remembered that these
drugs are intended to restore normal behavior and free the patient from
disordered thinking and bizarre conduct. Under no circumstances should they
be used as a form of punishment or for the convenience of the institutional staff.
In weighing the risks and benefits of the neuroleptic treatment, the physician
should be guided by the words of the Hippocratic oath:
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I will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according to my
ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone.
